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The 1990 Oil Price Hike in
Perspective
HE ECONOMIC EFFECTS of the sharp rise
in oil prices in 1990 were, for a while, the cen-
tral issue in discussions of the economic outlook
for 1990 and 1991. Iraq’s maneuvers to raise
the world price of oil late in July 1990 and
their invasion of Kuwait less than a week later
led to a doubling of oil prices. As a result, oil
price shocks and the appropriate economic
policy response to such shocks became subjects
of renewed speculation.
One of the most popular hypotheses to emerge
at the time was that, since the economy was
different in 1990 than it had been when previ-
ous large oil price increases occurred, the 1990
price rise should not affect the economy to the
same extent.’ It still was widely believed, how-
ever, that the principal and most immediate
effect would be the onset of a recession. In
response, many analysts believed that the Fed-
eral Reserve would ease monetary policy be-
cause they thought it had done so at the outset
of previous oil shocks.
This article outlines the potential channels of
influence of a rise in the price of oil and the ex-
tent to which the purported differences in eco-
lFjeleke (1990) was one of the first to develop this argu-
ment. Among the reasons he cites are differences in the
size of the shock, the sensitivity of oil consumers to oil
price changes, the state of the economy before the oil
shock and differences in available policy options. The
Council of Economic Advisers (1991) provides a more ex-
tensive discussion consistent with this view.
nomic conditions in 1990 could account for
differences between the economic effects of the
1990 oil price surge and those in earlier, com-
parable episodes.
WHY DO OIL PRICES MATTER?
One usually encounters two principal argu-
ments in assessing how oil and energy price
changes affect the economy. First, since energy
resources are used to produce other goods and
services, a change in their price affects how
much of the goods are produced as well as the
mix of resources that will be used to produce
them. This argument focuses on the supply side
of the markets for goods and services. It sug-
gests that the output losses associated with
higher energy prices are permanent, so that
changing economic policies or shifting market
prices cannot replace the loss.
A second argument focuses on the effects on
the demand for a country’s output. It suggests
that output losses are cyclical or transitory, so
that adjustments in wages and prices, or in eco-



















Each argument suggests which characteristics of
the economy determine the effects of an energy
price shock) as well as how changes in these
characteristics would alter these effects. Each
also provides a different conclusion about the
potential for economic policy to ameliorate the
adverse influences of energy price shocks.
Energy Prices and Economic Ca-
pacity: The Permanent Effects of
an Energy Price Shock
Energy resources are used to produce most
goods or services. As such, a rise in their price
will (1) raise the total cost of an efficient pro-
ducer’s output, (2) alter the most efficient means
for producing output, (3) lower the profit-maxi-
mizing level of output, (4) raise the long-run
equilibrium price of output and (5) reduce the
capacity output of each firm’s existing stock of
capital.~Capacity output declines when energy
prices rise because firms reduce their use of
energy and energy-using capital, some capital
becomes obsolete, and firms use labor and capi-
tal to economize on energy costs—that is, they
generally switch to less energy-intensive pro-
duction methods. The shaded insert on pages
6 and 7 briefly explains the microeconomic
foundations of this capacity effect.
The economy’s aggregate supply is the sum of
the supply decisions of the nation’s firms. Thus,
the effect of energy prices on the typical firm’s
economic capacity determines the effect on the
economy’s natural output and its aggregate sup-
ply. The influence of a rise in the price of ener-
gy on aggregate supply is shown in figure 1.
The aggregate supply curve indicates the output
that producers will supply at various levels of
the aggregate price level, given other factors
influencing this decision. The supply curve typi-
cally is derived from a given production func-
tion, which relates output to the employment of
resources such as labor and capital. An initial
level of nominal wages, the supplies of labor
and capital goods and the relative price of
energy resources are assumed to be given in
deriving a particular aggregate supply curve.
Suppose that the price level, P0 in figure 1,
results in a real wage (nominal wage deflated
by the price level) at which a given supply of
labor resources is fully employed. At this level
of employment, which often is referred to as
natural employment, the economy produces its
capacity or natural output level, X~.Given the
nominal wage level, the real wage is lower
when prices are higher than P0, so firms would
desire to produce more output and demand
more employment. Workers would be unwilling
to work more at a lower real wage, however,
so neither output nor employment could rise.
Indeed, to maintain output and employment, the
nominal wage must rise proportionately with
the price level to keep the real wage unchanged.
‘rhus, the aggregate supply curve is vertical at
X~for prices above P0. At a lower price level
than Pu, the real wage is too high for firms to
employ as much labor or produce as much out-
put as at X~output and employment are below
their natural counterparts along this upward-
sloping portion of the aggregate supply curve.
A rise in the relative price of energy, given
the short-run supply of capital and labor re-
sources, will reduce capacity output from X~to
X~ and raise the aggregate level of prices as-
sociated with this output from P°to P1. The
percentage decline in capacity output and the
rise in price level associated with each 1 per-
cent rise in the relative price of energy gener-
ally are equal and proportional to the share of
energy in the cost of output.3 In this case, al-
though real output has fallen, the level of nomi-
nal spending on output at point B in figure 1
will be the same as at point A. Thus, if output
is measured by the nation’s real GNP, then real
GNP is lower at point B than at point A, but
nominal GNP is the same.
Aggregate output and the price level are de-
termined by the interaction of aggregate supply
2This discussion draws upon Rasche and Tatom (1977a)
and (1981); Karnosky (1976) was one of the first to argue
that a rise in the price of energy reduces capacity and
raises the price level. Hickman, Huntington and Sweeney
(1987) summarize the similarities and differences ot empiri-
cal estimates of the effects of energy price shocks in 14
prominent macroeconomic models. All of these models
show a permanent output loss due to an oil price increase;
in six of these models, this loss is explictly cited as a
decline in potential output.
The Council of Economic Advisers (1991) suggests that
any effect on capacity is transitory. Others who have been
critical ot the significance ot the capacity effect include
Berndt (1980), Berndt and Wood (1987), Denison (1979)
and (1985), Darby (1984) and Olson (1988).
3The conditions required to obtain the equality ot these out-
comes are discussed in Rasche and Tatom (1977a) and
derived in Rasche and Tatom (1981). The shaded insert to
this article provides a summary of the analysis.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF St LOUISFigure 1
The Effect of a Higher Price
of Energy on Output and
the Price Level
and demand. Aggregate demand indicates the
quantity of output demanded at various price
levels and is inversely related to the general
price level. The aggregate demand curve in
figure 1 passes through both points A and B. At
these points, nominal GNP (the product of the
price level and output) is the same, indicating
that a rise in the price level is associated with
an equal proportionate decline in real output.
Thus, the nominal value of aggregate demand is
unaffected by the price level.
This assumption simplifies the analysis with-
out reducing its generality. The higher price
level reflects the permanent decline in natural
output, with no cyclical loss of output or em-
ployment; the smaller natural output level is
produced by an unchanged level of natural em-
ployment. Only a further reduction in output
would fit the notion of a cyclical loss associated
with cyclical unemployment.
For cyclical output and employment losses to
arise from an energy price increase, either (1)
4Tatom (1981) indicates that temporary cyclical effects oc-
cur for the third reason above; that is, they are short-run
dynamic variations as the economy moves from point A to
point 8. In this analysis, sticky prices keep the price level
from rising instantaneously. Inventories and increased em-
ployment initially are used to meet unchanged sales and
partially offset the productivity loss. Within a short time,
however, firms begin to reduce output because sales fall
5
aggregate demand must be more responsive to
a rise in the price level (flatter than that drawn
in figure 1), (2) an increase in the relative price
of energy must cause the aggregate demand to
shift to the left, or (3) there is some short-run
dynamics of price and output adjustment not
shown in the movement from A to B. For exam-
ple, if the price level adjusts upward slowly be-
cause of temporary rigidities in the prices of
goods and services, then a rise in energy prices
will lead producers to reduce employment tem-
porarily, reducing output by more than the
decline in natural output. When output prices
rise sufficiently to reduce real wages by the
extent of the permanent decline in labor pro-
ductivity, employment will be restored to its
natural level and output will have fallen only to
the extent of the capacity loss.~Thus, even if
the principal effects of an energy price rise are
a permanent decline in capacity and a rise in
the price level, some transitory recessionary
declines in output and employment are likely to
occur.
Energy Prices and Aggregate
Demand
The second channel of influence above indi-
cates that a rise in the relative price of energy
would shift aggregate demand to the left, reduc-
ing output and/or the level of prices. These ef-
fects are transitory, or cyclical, however, in
contrast to the permanent output loss arising
from reduced capacity. When output is less
than its natural level, employment is as well.
Thus, wages and rental prices of capital goods
will tend to fall, shifting the upward-sloping
portion of the aggregate supply curve and the
price level down until output is restored to its
natural level.
Aggregate demand will fall if a rise in oil
prices raises expenditures on oil and total im-
ports and thereby lowers net exports. In effect,
the rise in the oil import bill acts like a tax on
domestic income, reducing aggregate demand.
For such a shift in aggregate demand, the de-
cline in output and employment are propor-
more as prices begin to rise; cyclical losses in output and
employment occur. Empirical evidence indicates that, after
about a year, the price level has adlusted fully (to P1 in
figure 1), so producers step up production and employ-
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import status of a country determines the ef-
fects of an energy price shock.” Countries that I’he appropriate monetary policy respon e to
export oil face larger aggregate demand when a rise in the relative price of energy depends on
its dominant channel of influence. If the higher
energy price only lowered aggregate demand,
porter when oil prices rise, and conversely policymakers could take offsetting actions to
when oil prices fall.° neutralize this shift by increasing the money
“Feldstein (1990) and the Council of Economic Advisers
(1991) provide recent restatements of this shift in ag-
gregate demand and the price-level induced movement
along the aggregate demand curve as the central chan-
nels of influence of an oil price hike The Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers also emphasizes a decline in real
consumption expenditures as a result of an oil price hike
Perry (1991) argues that the oil price hike had little effect
on the economy in 1990, because it did not reduce real in
come much (operating through the aggregate demand


















tional to the rise in the oil price and the share
of oil imports in GNP. In this case, the net oil
oil prices rise; world aggregate demand and out-
put are redistributed from oil importers to cx-
rates to fight inflation” as, he argues, it had in the past.
~Achange in the relative price of energy could also affect
aggregate demand by altering investment in plant, equip-
ment and housing. Such an effect can account for a
decline in the real interest rate, which is incompatible with
a conventional model of aggregate demand. Reinhardt
(1991) discusses the effects of energy price shocks on in-
terest rates.
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supply, which would shift the aggregate de-
mand curve back to the right.
If an energy price increase affects aggregate
supply, however, both raising the price level
and reducing natural output, policymakers could
attempt to offset the price level rise by reducing
the money stock to reduce aggregate demand.
This would result in a cyclical loss in output
and employment as the economy’s output fell
short of its lower natural output level until the
price level declined sufficiently.
Alternatively, policymakers could attempt to
offset the reduction in output by raising ag-
gregate demand. Raising deniand could not re-
store the economy’s natural output, however; it
would not replace the energy and capital re-
sources that firms can no longer afford to pur-
chase or use. Instead, it would further raise the
aggregate level of pt-ices associated with the
smaller level of capacity output.7
Thus, there is no real policy dilemma posed
by oil price increases. Raising the money stock
cannot offset a loss in natural output, while
reducing the money stock can only offset a
price level increase at the cost of a further loss
in output and a cyclical rise in unemployment.
Moreover, it is viitually impossible to alter mon-
etary policy enough to fully offset the price
level surge because of the time it takes for a
change in the money stock to affect the price
level and because of the relatively small size of
the initial price response to changes in mone-
tary policy.8 An unchanged growth rate for the
money stock is a policy that accepts the peima-
nent output and price level consequences de-
scribed above without compounding one or the
other loss.
HAVE THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS
CHANGED?
Many analysts argued that the rise of oil
prices in 1990 would have substantially less im-
pact on the U.S. economy than earlier oil price
hikes. There were two versions of this argu-
ment. The first was that the adverse effects of
an oil price rise are proportional to the share of
oil imports in the economy and that this share
had fallen since the earlier oil price shocks. The
second argument was that the effects of an oil
price rise are proportional to the use of energy
per unit of output and that this dependence on
energy also had fallen.~
Does a Smaller Import Share
Reduce the Adverse Effects of an
Oil Price Hike?
If the shaie of oil imports in GNP has fallen,
then the first argument above implies that the
economy’s aggregate demand and output have
become less sensitive to a rise in oil prices.
Figure 2 shows expenditures on petroleum im-
ports as a percent of nominal GNP since 1970.
In mid-1990, this share was about 1 percent,
less than half its level in early 1979, but above
its 0.6 percent share in 1973. Thus, the share
had fallen below its level preceding only one of
the previous two oil price shocks.
The import share argument has other short-
comings. First, it suggests that oil-exporting
countries, including Canada in 1974 or the
United Kingdom in 1979, should gain when oil
prices rise, because net exports and aggregate
demand should rise. In each instance, however,
output did not rise nor was there other evi-
dence of a cyclical expansion following the
previous oil price shocks. The argument also
suggests that countries that import a relatively
small share of their oil, like the United States,
will be less affected than countries that import
relatively niore of their oil, like Germany or
Japan. The earlier experience with oil price
shocks indicates that, especially in 1973-74, both
the temporaty rise in inflation and the perma-
nent loss in output were larger in Japan than in
7Kahn and Hampton (1990) contrasl three monetary policy
options, which include iighiening to offset the price level
effect, easing to offsei the cyclical effects and a neutral
policy which “maintains constant monetary or nominal
GNP growth’ Feldstein (1990) endorses the third option,
nominal GNP targeting, and he also equaies this with un-
changed money stock growth,
‘See Tatom (1981) and (1988a), for example, for evidence
on the relative size and lag lengths for energy price and
monetary policy effects on prices and output.
‘See Council of Economic Advisers (1991). Kahn and
Hampton (1990), Anderson, Bryan and Pike (1990), Brinner
(1990). ‘How Big An Oil Shock” (1990), ‘‘Shocked Again”
(1990). May (1990). Yanchar (1990) and Fieleke (1990) for
analyses thai emphasize one or both of these arguments.
Fieleke, Kahn and Hampion. May and Yanchar emphasize,
to varying degrees, that the expecied effecis also are
smaller because of a smaller expected rise in the price of
oil,
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Figure 2
Petroleum Imports as a Percent of GNP
the United States, but that these effects were
smallest in Germany.1°
There are three other major difficulties with
the import shai-e argument. First, it is difficult
to reconcile the relatively large economic effects
of oil price hikes with the relatively small size
of the petroleum import share. Second, an ag-
gregate demand reduction in the face of an oil
price hike implies only a cyclical decline in out-
put, not a permanent one. The failure of real
GNP per worker and real wages to return to
their previous growth trends in virtually all na-
tions after the two previous OPEC price hikes is
not consistent with the pattern expected for’ a
purely cyclical loss. Third, the trade-based ag-
“’See Rasche and Tatom (1981), Tatom (1987) and Tatom
(1988a) for reviews of this international evidence. In 1973,
the share of petroleum imports in GNP equaled 1.7 per-
cent in Germany and 1.6 percent in Japan, much more
than the 0,6 percent in the United States. Similarly, in
1978, this share was 2.7 percent in Japan, 2.5 percent in
Germany and 1.9 percent in the United States.
115ee Tatom (1988b) for a discussion of the theory and evi-
dence supporting such contrary effects. Consistent with
gregate demand story predicts a decline in net
exports and the currency value of a large oil
importer after an oil price shock. At least for
the United States, however, exports rose rela-
tive to imports so that both net exports and the
exchange rate rose after each earlier oil price
shock. Indeed, the only periods of positive net
exports since 1970 occui-red in 1974-75 and
1979-82, following the earlier oil price hikes.”
Does Increased Energy Efficiency
Reduce the Adverse Effects of an
Oil Price Hike?
The second argument for less adverse effects
of the 1990 price hike is based on a decline in
this rise in net demand for U.S. goods, the trade-weighted
value of the dollar rose in lV/1 973 and /1974, and was
higher over the rest of 1974 than it had been in the two
quarters preceding the oil price rise. In the second quarter
of 1979, the value of the dollar also rose slightly. Over the
next four quarters, the value of the dollar was only 0.6 per-
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energy use per unit of output. According to this
argument, energy is less important to a firm’s
production than in the past, so a rise in oil
prices is expected to have a smaller effect on
prices and production today than in the past.
Figure 3 shows total U.S. energy use per unit
of output (measured in BTUs per unit of real
GNP) from 1970 to 1988, the latest year availa-
ble on this basis.”’ Energy use per unit of out-
put has fallen sharply since 1973: ETUs used
per unit of real GNP were about 31 percent
lower in 1988 than in 1973 and about 22 per-
cent lo~vei-than in 1979. This rise in output per
unit of energy is not surprising given the rise in
the relative price of energy since 1973, but it is
not relevant in assessing the importance of
energy as a resource or in assessing whether
the effects of an energy price boost have
declined in magnitude.
While energy use per unit of output is lower
than earlier, the responsiveness of prices or out-
put to a change in a resource’s price are pro-
portional to the share of the resource’s cost in
total cost, not to the share of its quantity in out-
put. Consider the familiar case of labor produc-
tivity. Labor employment per unit of output in
the business sector declined by nearly one-third
front 1955 to 1973, as output per worker rose
from $21,084 to $31,142 (1982 prices). Thus, the
economy became less dependent on labor over
these 18 years—in exactly the same sense and
to nearly the same extent as some have sug-
gested about energy resources over the past 18
years. Nevertheless, the share of labor in total
“’The energy expenditures and quantity data used for
figures 2 and 3 are from the Energy Information Adminis-
tration, State Energy Price and Expenditure Report, 1988
(September 1990).
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 1988
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Figure 4
Energy Expenditures as a Percent of GNP
annual basis), the share fell. By 1988, the share
nearly had returned to its 1970-73 level. These
data suggest that the share of energy in the
cost of the economy’s output has not fallen be-
low its level before the earlier oil price changes,
especially the 1973-74 rise. Thus, these data do
not support the view that a doubling of the
price of oil should be expected to have smaller
effects in 1990 than it had earlier, especially in
1973-74, because the share of energy in total
cost has not declined.
RECENT OIL AND ENERGY PRICE
DEVELOPMENTS
The economic effects of an energy price shock
depend on the size of the price change as much
as they depend on the responsiveness of mea-
sures of economic performance to a given
discusses other shortcomings of using the energy-output
ratio for analytical or policy purposes.
cost was about the same: 65.3 percent in 1973
and 64.8 percent in 1955. For a given share of
labor in cost, a percentage point rise in the wage
rate will raise the cost of an additional unit of
output and price in proportion to this share.13
Analysts who emphasized the increased pro-
ductivity of energy are unlikely to espouse the
equivalent view that a 10 percent rise in wages
has a smaller effect on unit costs or product
prices today than in 1973 or 1955. As discussed
previously, the response of capacity and price
to changes in a resource’s price depends on the
share of the resource in cost, not on its produc-
tivity or output per unit.
Figure 4 shows how the share of energy ex-
penditures as a percent of GNP has changed
from 1970 to 1988. Following each energy price
hike, expenditures rose sharply relative to GNP;
as energy prices fell beginning in 1982 (on an
“’A typical discussion of the relationship between wages,
productivity and prices can be found in Fischer, Dorn-




























change in energy prices. Table I shows the
monthly average price of oil purchased by re-
finers since June 1990. Following the Iraqi inva-
sion of Kuwait and the subsequent U.N. embargo
of crude oil exports from both countries, the
price of oil doubled within three months. The
1990 oil price rise was comparable in magnitude
to the two earlier OPEC price hikes in 1973-74
and 1979-80. In each of these previous cases, oil
prices nearly doubled. In the second instance,
oil prices rose again sharply in the first quarter
of 1981.
A rise in the price of oil is likely to raise the
cost of production of competing energy sources
and raise the demand for competing forms of
energy, as consumers substitute other fuels for
oil. For both reasons, the prices of competing
sources of energy change along with the price
of oil. Thus, an oil price shock can be consi-
dered more generally an energy price shock.
Figure 5 shows the relative price of crude
petroleum—measured by the producer price
index for crude petroleum deflated by the busi-
ness sector implicit price deflator—and the rela-
tive price of energy—the producer price of fuel,
power and related products relative to the same
deflator.14 The relative price affects economic
performance because producers of goods and
services assess the cost of energy relative to the
goods and services produced using it. From the
third quarter of 1973 to the third quarter of
1974, the relative price of crude oil nearly dou-
bled. Measured in 1990 prices, the composite
refiner acquisition cost of crude oil rose from
$10.67 per barrel in 1973 to $21.28 in 1974, or
99.4 percent.”’ In the second OPEC oil price
shock, from early 1979 to the second quarter of
1980, this relative price of oil nearly doubled
Table 1
The Composite Refiners Acquisition
Cost of Crude Oil (dollars per barrel)
Date Price Date Price
Juie 1990 $1498 January 1991 $2290
July 16 15 February 1902
Augusl 23 57 March 17 89
September 3001 AprI 18.43
October 33.18 May 1860
November 3061 June 1798
December 2621
again, rising from $22.35 per barrel to $41.82
per barrel. A further surge in early 1981 put
the price up to $50.75 per barrel.
From the second quarter of 1990 to the
fourth quarter of 1990, the price of oil rose
from $16.10 per barrel to $30.00 per barrel, an
86.3 percent rise that is almost as large as the
near-doubling in the previous two oil shocks.”
If the effects of oil price hikes are proportional
to their size, then the effects of the 1990 in-
crease should be about the same as in the two
previous instances. The relative price of energy
rose about 50 percent during the previous two
energy price shocks. From the second quarter
of 1990 to the fourth quarter of 1990, however,
the relative price of energy rose 29.6 percent,
about 60 percent of the earlier magnitudes.”
Thus, on this basis, the recent energy price
shock is somewhat smaller.
‘~Alogarithmic scale is used because differences in
logarithms show percentage changes; an equal-sized in-
crease or decrease in figure 5 reflects equal percentage
changes. For example, a rise from 5010 100, or 100 to
200 represents a doubling of the relative price and the
respective distance in each case is the same in figure 5.
“’The rise in the relative price of oil shown in the figure ac-
tually begins in early 1973, but this earlier increase largely
reflects partial and temporary relaxation of U.S. price con-
trols on domestic crude oil prices. The much larger OPEC
price increases followed the Yom Kippur War in October
1973. The 1947 oil price shock is not discussed here. The
producer price for crude petroleum measures prices paid
to domestic producers, which were controlled from 1971 to
early 1981. Over most of this period, the composite refiner
acquisition cost was higher, but was representative of oil
prices paid by domestic purchasers.
“The total output of Kuwait and Iraq fell about 4 million bar-
rels per day in August 1990 from its May-July 1990 aver-
age; by November and December 1990, it was down 4.6
million from the earlier average. The latter reduction
equaled 7.6 percent of world production and 19 percent of
OPEC output. In comparison, the reductions in the total of
Iran and Iraq production from 1978 to its lowest annual
average level in 1981 was somewhat larger, 5.4 million
barrels per day, but this was 18.2 percent of OPEC’s 1978
production.
“Empirical estimates suggest that the relative price of ener-
gy adjusts contemporaneously and with a one-quarter lag
to changes in the relative price of oil; thus, one reason for
the relatively smaller rise in the energy price is the fact
that the relative price of crude oil fell 20.6 percent in the
second quarter of 1990. When expressed in logarithms,
each 1 percentage-point rise in the relative price of crude
oil is estimated to result in about a one-half percent rise in
the relative price of energy. See Tatom (1987b).
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Figure 5
Relative Price of Energy and Crude Petroleum
as a temporary acceleration in inflation and a
temporary reduction in output growth. More-
over, temporary rigidities in nominal prices and
lags in the adjustments that firms and con-
sumers make in response to large price changes
were likely to give rise to temporary movements
in employment, including a recessionary decline
in employment, although past experience sug-
gests that such a change occurs with a delay of
about one year. These effects should he expected
to have been somewhat smaller than those fol-
lowing previous oil shocks, because the rise in
the relative price of energy in the 1990 episode
was only about 60 percent as large as the pi-evi-
ous increases.
Following the sharp rise in the relative price
of energy in 1973-74 and 1979-80, the loss in ca-
pacity and adjustment to a higher price level, as
discussed earlier in reference to figure 1, were
reflected in a temporary acceleration in the in-
flation rate. In each case, output growth slowed,
reflecting both the permanent decline in natural
output and a transitory loss in output. Produc-
‘I’here were two other important differences
between the recent rise and the previous two.
First, the recent rise occurred much more
quickly—in two quarters instead of four or six.
Second, the recent increase did not persist.
Nevertheless, producers did not know at the
time whether, or by how much, oil prices might
decline in the future. ‘I’his article assumes that
producers treat price changes as permanent, in
the sense that the expected price they use for
economic decisions is the current price. It also
focuses only on the effects of the recent price
increase. To the extent that producers did not
anticipate having to face the price increase, the
effects of the price shock should be smaller.
THE EXPERIENCE IN PREVIOUS
OIL PRICE SHOCKS
The previous discussion of energy price ef-
fects indicates that the 1990 oil price hike should
he associated with a lower level of natural out-
put and productivity and a rise in the price
level. These changes were likely to be revealed
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tivity (and real wages) fell.” Generally, the per-
manent loss in output and productivity and the
rise in prices were experienced first, with the
temporary surge in inflation (as measured by
the GNP deflator) delayed about two quarters.”’
Employment declined much later and for only a
few quarters. Cyclical unemployment associated
with an oil price rise peaked about six quarters
later, before quickly dissipating.
Table 2 shows these developments for the
three most recent large energy price hikes. For
periods surrounding each oil price hike, the ta-
ble provides real GNP growth, productivity (bus-
iness sector output per hour) growth, the rate
of increase in the GNP deflator, civilian employ-
ment growth, the average unemployment rate
for the civilian labor force and money stock
(Ml) growth. Each measure is provided for the
year before and the first four consecutive two-
quarter periods following the shock. Two-quar-
ter periods are used to simplify the data presen-
tation, although the timing of energy price
effects facilitates the usefulness of this proce-
dure. OPECI refers to the first oil price shock
which began in IV/1973. OPEC2 begins in 11/1979
and IRAQ begins in 111/1990.
As table 2 indicates, real GNP growth slowed
following the two previous oil price hikes, but
did not become negative on a two-quarter basis
until after the first two quarters (OPEC1) or
after a year (OPECZ). The slowing in output
growth reflects both the decline in natural out-
put and, principally later, a temporary cyclical
loss in output. Table 2 also shows that the ex-
pected productivity decline (negative growth) oc-
curred more quickly than the decline in real
GNP in the previous two cases; it began in the
first two quarters of the energy price shock in
each case. Both productivity and output growth
show a sharp cyclical acceleration in the last
two-quarter period.
The most recent energy price shock, like the
earlier two, was accompanied by an immediate
dechne in productivity and a slowing in output
growth.”’ Output growth became negative earlier
than in the previous two cases. Since the recent
energy price hike occurred over only two quar-
ters, the period of decline in productivity and
output growth should be correspondingly shorter
than in the previous two instances. The slight
rise in productivity growth in the second two-
quarter period is consistent with this expectation.
In the previous two instances, the decline in
productivity and natural output was reflected,
with about a two-quarter lag, in a sharp and
temporary acceleration in the rate of price in-
crease as measured by the GNP deflator. Thus,
in the second two-quarter period in OPECI, in-
flation accelerated sharply and only temporarily,
reflecting the one-time adjustment in the price
level. The same acceleration occurs in OPEC2,
but with a one-quarter lag; the data for the
two-quarter period ending one quarter later are
shown in parentheses. As table 2 shows, how-
ever, in the first two-quarter period,- the rate of
increase in the GNP deflator rose (OPEC1) or
was unchanged (OPEC2); in the latest instance,
it declined.”’
In the previous two cases, the delayed acceler-
ation in the rate of price increase persisted for
about four quarters (five quarters for OPEC2),
about as long as the period of sharp increases
in energy prices. There is also an acceleration
in the recent second two-quarter period (1/1991
and 11/1991). Since the latest price hike occurred
over half as many quarters as in the previous
“’These developments were observed in nearly all countries.
The notable exception was that income policies impeded
the reductions in real wages (and, therefore, in labor
productivity) in some countries, especially in 1973-74, so
that the effective supply of natural employment fell, further
reducing natural output. See Rasche and Tatom (1977a),
(1977b) and (1981), Tatom (1988a) and (1987). Hamilton
(1983) also provides empirical evidence supporting the
permanent effect on U.S. real GNP. Helliwell, Sturm, Jar-
rett and Salou (1986) provide international evidence on the
effect on natural output.
195ee, for example, Tatom (1981) and (1988a). The lag for
the PCE deflator and CPI is shorter (one quarter) and the
magnitude is larger for these consumer price series, be-
cause the share of energy cost in expenditures is larger
for consumer expenditures than for GNP as a whole.
Thus, the effect of a given rise in oil prices is larger for
consumer price inflation measures. The effects on
producer prices occur even faster and are even larger.
““Productivity growth had declined more rapidly in the year
before the recent oil price shock than it did in the initial
two-quarter period, so productivity growth did not actually
slow in the second half of 1990.
“‘The initial decline in the rate of price increase in the first
two-quarter period is not out of line. In each of the previ-
ous initial two-quarter periods, this rate was much lower in
at least one of the two quarters. In particular, in the first
quarter of 1974, the rate of increase of the deflator fell to
a 5.6 percent rate; in 1979, it fell from 9.5 percent in the
first quarter to a 9.2 percent rate in the second quarter
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two, the acceleration would be expected to be growth of civilian employment. In the two pre-
reversed in the third two-quarter period, even vious instances, employment growth slowed, but
without any effect from the decline in energy did not become negative until a year after the
prices in 1/1991 and 11/1991. It remains to be energy price shock began. Moreover, this de-
seen whether inflation will decline as abruptly dine occurred in only one two-quarter period
as it did following earlier oil price shocks.”” (the third one), when employment fell at a rela-
I The delayed cyclical response to an energy tively rapid pace. Thus, the typical recessionary price hike is seen most clearly by looking at the characteristic of falling employment did not oc-
I “2The rate of increase in the CPI rose from a 3.8 percent and fourth quarters of 1990, respectively. The rate of in- rate in the second quarter of 1990 to about a 7 percent crease of the latter two price measures fell sharply in the rate in the third and fourth quarters of 1990. Similarly, the first half of 1991, reflecting the quicker response of these
rate of increase of the producer price index rose from a measures to a rise in energy prices as well as to their sub-
0.3 percent rate in the second quarter of 1990 to a 6.6 sequent decline.
percent rate and a 10.8 percent rate in the third quarter
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 199116
cur until a year after the onset of the two pre-
vious energy price hikes.
The unemployment rate also did not rise im-
mediately after the two previous adverse energy
pr’ice shocks. In 1973-74, it fell slightly in the
fourth quarter of 1973, rose only 0.8 percen-
tage points by the third quarter of 1974, then
peaked 3.3 percentage points higher three quar-
ters later.”~The unemployment rate peaked six
quarters after the initial surge in energy prices,
in the last period shown in the table. In the
second quarter of 1979, the initial quarter of
OPEC2, the unemployment rate also fell slightly,
then rose gradually for the next three quarters
so that it was only 0.4 percentage points higher
in 1/1980 than it was before the energy price
shock. The unemployment rate then rose 1.4
percentage points to a peak in 111/1980, six quar-
ters after the initial energy price surge.”’
In the most recent case, the unemployment
rate rose immediately, climbing from 5.5 per-
cent in July 1990 to 7 percent in June 1991.
Such a rise is substantially different ftomn the
pattern in the initial stages of the previous en-
ergy price shocks.
Its behavior might better he understood in the
context of the slowing in U.S. economic activity
that began in 1988. For example, civilian em-
ployment actually began declining sharply in
March 1990, five months before the energy
pt-ice hike; civilian employment fell at a 0.9 per-
cent rate from March to July 1990 and declined
further at a 0.5 percent rate from July to Oc-
tober 1990, when energy prices peaked; from
October 1990 to August 1991, such employment
fell at a 1.3 percent rate. Thus, the path of eco-
nomic activity downward into recession had
begun well before energy prices rose.25
A Coniparison of Changes in Mone-
tary Policy Actions
Each of the two previous oil shocks were fol-
lowed by changes in monetary policy actions.
There is no clear initial pattern, as money
growth slowed in the initial two quarters in
1973-74 but accelerated in 1979. As shown at
the bottom of table 2, however, in each case,
Ml growth then slowed sharply during the se-
cond two-quarter period, at the same time that
the rate of price increase temporarily accelerat-
ed.2” Then, in each instance, Nil growth acceler-
ated sharply in the fourth two-quartet- period
following the sharp rise in the unemployment
rate.
The expectation that the economy would
quickly experience a recessionary rise in unem-
ployment because of the 1990 oil price rise was
widespread. There were equally widespread
warnings against repeating the “typical” policy
response of easing monetary policy to combat
this unemployment.”’ While there is evidence of
rising unemployment and subsequent accelera-
tions in Ml growth following previous oil price
surges, these changes came more than a year
after the initial oil price rise. These changes also
occurred after the substantial slowing of Ml
growth and the transitory inflation rate hike
that are more closely associated with the oil
price increases.
In the most recent case, money (Ml) growth
slowed from a 4.8 percent rate from IV/1989 to
11/1990 to a 3.7 percent rate in 111/1990 and to a
3.5 percent rate in lV/1990. Money growth
quickly reversed course, however, accelerating
to a 6.8 percent rate, as the unemployment rate
continued to rise in the first half of 1991. This
““One explanation for the initial decline in the unemploy-
ment rate when oil prices rise relies on the capacity loss
and “sticky” prices. The initial fall in productivity and ini-
tial absence of a price-related decline in aggregate de-
mand when oil prices rise require that producers raise
employment to offset some of the output loss and avoid
larger-than-desired depletion of inventory. See Tatom
(1981) and Ott and Tatom (1986) for discussions of this ef-
fect. Rasche and Tatom (1977a) show that employment
rose during the first three quarters of the 1973-74 oil
shock and did not fall until five quarters later.
“41n this second instance, a further rise in energy prices late
in 1980 and early in 1981 contributed to a further rise in
the unemployment rate about a year later, from IV/1981 to
1/1982.
““Other analysts have emphasized this point. See Weiden-
baum (1990) and Erceg and Leovic (1990), for example.
““After late 1982, monetary policymakers placed relatively
more emphasis on M2 instead of Ml. Another measure,
the adjusted monetary base, is often a convenient sum-
mary measure of monetary policy actions. Higher energy
prices significantly raise relative currency demand one
quarter later, reducing monetary aggregates relative to the
adjusted monetary base; see Tatom (1990). Thus, mone-
tary base growth is less useful as an indicator of monetary
policy during energy price shocks. Bullard (1991) discuss-
es these and other indicators of monetary policy and the
potentially conflicting signals they offer.
“For example, according to Trehan (1990), “Researchers
have generally concluded that the Fed eased policy to
overcome the reduction in output caused by the oil embar-
go” and “.. the Fed’s initial response to the second oil
shock also was similar to its response to the first oil
shock.” See also, Council of Economic Advisers (1991),
which indicates that policy was excessively stimulative pri-
or to the previous oil shocks so that it lacked credibility,
making efforts to ease ineffective. The Council of Econom-
ic Advisers (p. 80) suggests such temporary actions would
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acceleration in Ml growth occurred earlier than
it had following the previous oil pride hikes,
although it did follow both a previous slowing
in Ml growth and a recessionary rise in the un-
employment rate, just as had similar accelera-
tions in Ml following the two previous energy
price increases.””
CONCLUSION
The rise in oil prices from August to October
1990 set in motion renewed concern and confu-
sion over both the effects of oil price hikes and
the appropriate monetary policy response. Three
views achieved widespread acceptance. First, the
economy was believed to be less sensitive to oil
price hikes than it had been earlier. Second, it
was widely believed that the principal and most
immediate effect would be a cyclical decline in
output and employment. Third, analysts believed
that the Fed would ease policy, as it had when
faced with this problem in the past.
These views are at odds with previous ex-
perience. In 1990, the share of oil imports in
GNP and energy per unit of GNP had not fallen
to the level before the first oil price shock in
1973. Moreover, the relevant parameter, the
share of energy in cost, had not fallen below its
1973 level either. Thus, U.S. economic perfor-
niance should not have become less sensitive to
oil price shocks than it was before. In addition,
negative employment growth and an accelera-
tion in money growth had not characterized the
initial year of previous energy price shocks.
Earlier evidence suggests that the principal
cost of an energy price hike is the loss in capac-
ity output and productivity. A counterpart of
this loss is a one-time surge in the general level
of prices, which follows the energy price hike
relatively closely. The adverse cyclical conse-
quences of past shocks occurred later. The prin-
cipal policy response following previous oil price
hikes was a slowing in money growth. Later,
when inflation declined and the unemployment
rate rose sharply, money growth accelerated.
The 1990 oil price rise occurred against the
backdrop of a slowing in money and output
28M2 shows the same pattern. It grew at a 2.5 percent rate
from Il/i 990 to lV/l 990, down from a 4 percent rate in
11/1990 or the 5.1 percent rise in the two-quarter period
ending in 11/1990. In the first half of 1991, M2 growth also
rose, but only to a 4.2 percent rate. Bullard (1991) indi-
cates that Fed decisionmakers were keenly aware of the
policy dilemma and chose to pursue a course of neither
growth that had been under way since late in
1988. Thus, the expected productivity decline
and temporary surge in inflation were accompa-
nied by a continuing decline in employment and
cyclical output loss. While these developments
were uncharacteristic of the initial effects of
previous oil price hikes, monetary growth slowed
in the second half of 1990 anyway.
There were other distinguishing features as-
sociated with the 1990 oil price hike. Foremost
among them was its brevity: it occurred over a
three-month period and was nearly reversed in
another five months. Thus, while the response
of output, productivity and prices appears con-
sistent with the capacity-loss-induced effects as-
sociated with previous oil price doublings, the
subsequent decline in oil prices from October
1990 to March 1991 can be expected to result
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